Introduction

In his 1996 essay Rethinking Democracy, neopragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty outlines four theses of postmodern scepticism. [Rorty 2022:68]

Thesis 1 - There is no intrinsic character of reality, no one way the world is. No description of the world is closer to nature than any other.

Thesis 1 emphasises that we shouldn’t favour one description of the world over another because the world is a particular way. We can have multiple descriptions of the world and it's the usefulness of those descriptions that ultimately make us prefer some over others.

Thesis 2 - There is no correspondence to reality to serve as the mark of truth. Rather, we call beliefs true when they seem better tools than any as-yet-imagined alternative beliefs.

Thesis 2 rejects the correspondence theory of truth (CTT), which states that a proposition is true when it corresponds with reality. So suppose you look at the mirror and you state the proposition: "I have brown eyes, not blue eyes". As far as the CTT is concerned, the proposition is true if the pigment in your Iris is brown, not blue. If the pigment was any other colour, the proposition would be false.

Richard Rorty's neopragmatism, on the other hand, would state that the belief that you have brown eyes is a better predictor of describing the colour of our eyes than blue eyes. The focus wouldn't be on the colour of pigment in the Iris, but rather on the practical consequences of using a concept of a colour to describe the eye. So if you said green instead, that would conflict with other assertions you'd make such as the proposition of "the colour of soil being green".

Thesis 3 - Interpretation goes all the way down: there is no contrast between a fact and an interpretation except degrees of consensus: a "fact" is a widely accepted interpretation.

This thesis denies the existence of facts in of themselves. Instead, a fact is merely an interpretation that has gained a certain level of consensus regarding its truthfulness, thereby justifying the label “fact.” Everything is essentially an interpretation, and those interpretations that have achieved a consensus of truthfulness are considered facts. Therefore, the interpretation “Keir Starmer is the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom” is an interpretation of the world that has garnered such a strong consensus that we refer to it as a fact. Facts are what the social consensus is.

Thesis 4 - There is no objective fact about human beings which dictates our biological species should also be a moral community. The project of constructing such a community is one interpretation of the significance of the human existence among others.

Thesis 4 denies the existence of a moral fact that establishes humanity as a moral community. This doesn’t negate the desirability of a cosmopolitan moral community encompassing the entire globe. Instead, it asserts that there’s no fact underlying that claim. The significance we attach to human existence relative to other communities ultimately determines whether such a community can be realised.

The objective of this essay is a rejection of postmodern scepticism outlined by all four theses. We'll begin by critiquing the first three theses applied to the natural sciences. Despite evidence that quantum mechanics does in fact support thesis 1, overall postmodern scepticism doesn't stand up to scrutiny. We'll then scrutinise thesis 4, as well as demonstrate further weaknesses of thesis 3, in situations where genocides happen.

Part One: The Natural Sciences

Newtonian Mechanics vs General Relativity

Newtonian mechanics and postmodern scepticism initially contradict each other. Newton's theory posits an absolute space in which there is a single explanation for everything within a physical system. Thesis 1 is clearly contradicted and believers in Newtonian physics would reject thesis 2 and thesis 3.

However, Newtonian mechanics from a CTT perspective is objectively wrong about the fundamental nature of space and time. There is no absolute space. The ontology of Newtonian mechanics is plain wrong. This becomes apparent when large gravitational objects, e.g. black holes and neutron stars, come into the equation. In absolute space, black holes wouldn't even exist and neutron stars wouldn't be able to engage in gravitational lensing. Yet we know, irrespective of how that knowledge is acquired, that we have a supermassive black hole Sagittarius A* at the centre of the Milky Way.

In fact, Newtonian Mechanics posits that the entire universe is governed by a single, universal clock. Space and time are absolute entities, ensuring that Newton’s first law of motion holds consistently in Newtonian space and time. Consequently, we have a global inertial frame of reference that defines a global coordinate system in which Newton’s first law of motion is always valid. This shared clock arises because space and time behave uniformly across the universe. Regardless of your location, time will remain the same globally.

Newton's first law: Every body perseveres in its state of being at rest or of moving uniformly straight forward except insofar as it is compelled to change its state by forces impressed. (Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica)

However, general relativity reveals that this isn’t the case. Space and time are relativistic entities. Only local inertial frames of reference exist. This is because for an inertial frame of reference to be valid, space must be flat. Yet, general relativity asserts that space-time is curved, otherwise there wouldn’t be any gravity. Without a global inertial frame of reference, there’s no universal clock we all share. There are only local clocks that are accurate within the local inertial frame of reference. these local inertial frame of references can be translated into one another however, by a mathematical technique called a Lorentz transformation.

Consequently, there’s no universal “now.” It doesn’t make sense to say that you’ll fall into Sagittarius A*’s event horizon at the same time I write this essay. What makes sense is that at the moment I write this essay, which is my “now,” you’ll get close to the event horizon but never pass. At the same time, in your frame of reference, when you enter the black hole, which is your “now,” I’ll be doing something in what I consider my future.

My “now” and your “now” don’t necessarily coincide. In fact, it’s a useful fiction that we have a simultaneous “now”—a single moment when Francesco Acerbi scored that equaliser in the greatest Champions League semi-final of all time. However, this isn’t entirely accurate. We’re all affected by Earth’s gravity, so those on top of Mount Vesuvius, watching the final, have a different inertial frame of reference and sense of “now” compared to those in the San Siro. Nevertheless, these differences are so minuscule that we can’t perceive them and are irrelevant. It’s practically convenient and effectively true that those on Mount Vesuvius and those in the San Siro share a “now.”

What does all this tell us? The validity of Newtonian Mechanics is determined by its predictive capabilities and practical utility, not by its correspondence to reality. Our common sense of time is a useful fiction that helps coordinate global actions. For instance, it enables us to know when the Internazionale football match against Barcelona commenced, when the New York Stock Exchange will open for trading, what I was doing when someone I knew reached the summit of Mount Everest, or what we were doing when Neil Armstrong made the first lunar landing. Nevertheless, it’s a useful lie that deceives us for practical purposes.

Initially, this may seemingly support postmodern scepticism. We've acknowledged that the truth of Newtonian mechanics is not determined by correspondence with reality, but its predictive success and usefulness in developing technologies. This supports thesis 1. However, the example does not demonstrate Thesis 2 is correct. We have strong reasons for thinking the predictive success of general relativity also tells us about how the theory corresponds with the fundamental nature of space and time, at least at large scales. General relativity does not support Thesis 3 either, because there are objective facts about the system.

Thesis 1 is still upheld by general relativity. It's not because space-time is relativistic. We have mentioned that local inertial frames of references can be translated into one another via Lorentz transformations. That actually provides an objective grounding for relativity. Rather, it's the issue of quantum gravity that supports thesis 1. We know when relativistic mechanics reaches the quantum scale, or Planck scale - the smallest physically meaningful distances, that general relativity breaks down. At that point, we now the ontology of the theory completely breaks down. Resolving this is one of the great challenges, if not the greatest challenge, of 21st century physics.

Quantum Mechanics and Anti-Realism

Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, provides little concrete information about the ontology of the theory. Whereas the success of general relativity lends support for treating relativistic space-time as ontologically real at large scales, we cannot say the same about the multitude of interpretations and formalisations of quantum mechanics. For instance, some formalisations focus on the wavefunction as describing the possible states in a quantum system, whereas other formalisations exclude it altogether focusing on matrixes, or consistent histories, instead.

The Consistent Histories Approach to Quantum Mechanics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Even when formalisations agree that the wavefunction exists, the physical interpretation of it is in question. Some believe that the wavefunction is ontologically real, whereas others think it's a purely mathematical description of the quantum system before a measurement configuring the system into a particular way is made.

David Mermin encapsulated this elusiveness by proclaiming, “shut up and calculate!” Quantum physicists precisely predict reality through their equations, without delving into the ontology of the theory itself. These predictions paved the way for the engineering of semiconductors, which would have been an insurmountable task otherwise. Moreover, quantum mechanics stands as the most extensively and accurately tested scientific theory in history. All this, despite the fact that quantum physicists remain perplexed about the physical meaning of these equations. Mermin's approach is what we call instrumentalism.

The issue with most of these interpretations is that they lack testability and don’t provide a clear advantage over the others. Interpretations like the Copenhagen interpretation collapse the wavefunction under certain conditions. However, how can we determine whether the wavefunction is real or merely a mathematical representation when attempts to measure it lead to its collapse? This is an unsolvable problem. Similarly, how can we prove the existence of other universes, each with every possible permutation of the wavefunction’s contents? This is another unanswerable question using empirical methods.

Furthermore, quantum mechanics and general relativity are incompatible. The laws of physics break down when we trace the universe's history to the Big Bang where the size of the universe is at the quantum scale. Are any of these interpretations capable of overcoming this incompatibility, providing a way to model reality that makes them compatible? Unfortunately, none of them offer such a solution. Instead physicists have built alternative theories, like String theory or quantum loop gravity, to surpass these issues but we have no convincing evidence that either, or alternatives, are true.

None of the interpretations have given us an ontology we can use as a basis for integrating quantum mechanics and general relativity together resolving the problem of quantum gravity or explaining the Big Bang singularity, if there was one.

Mermin's instrumental approach to quantum mechanics and even the denial of the physical reality, only acknowledging the mathematical reality, of the wavefunction in some interpretations is a form of anti-realism. The internal logic of quantum mechanics, which must also be represented through a quantum logical calculus, provides the backing of quantum theory, not any correspondence with reality supporting Thesis 2.

The multiple formalisations and interpretations supports Thesis 1. There are multiple ways of describing the exact same quantum system which are equivalent to one another. They'll yield the same predictions.

However, Thesis 3 is not supported. It is not consensus that makes quantum mechanics true, but rather objectively accurate predictions which clearly tell us how the world at the quantum scale works. It's the methodology of science and sheer quantity of accurate predictions that built the consensus that quantum mechanics is right. This tells us that pragmatism, not postmodern scepticism, is the better alternative for explaining how we acquired knowledge about quantum mechanics. There is an argument that Thesis 3 applies when thinking about which interpretation quantum physicists prefer, which is based on consensus. But quantum mechanics itself is not a fact because consensus tells us it is, rather because of the accuracy of its predictions.

Five-Sigma and the Scientific Method

After concluding the methodology of science provides the justification for thinking quantum mechanics is true, we must venture further into how that method works and how postmodern scepticism fits in.

Scientists establish confidence in their results through methods like the "five sigma" test. This is the burden of proof that scientists must meet before announcing a discovery. When analysing a data sample, physicists want to know whether they are looking at statistical fluctuations in the sample or are observing a new phenomenon. The five-sigma test states that there must be a 1/3,500,000, or 0.00003% chance, that the data is a statistical fluctuation for a discovery to be made.

Let's first work through the logic of the test. We begin with a collection data samples which may include the phenomenon we want to test. We calculate the mean of the data sample and then compare with the data of the suspected phenomenon. The standard deviation, 𝝈, tells us how far away the data of the phenomena is from the mean. The further away, i.e.the higher the standard deviation, then the higher the probability that the data collected is the phenomenon under question. The lower the standard deviation the more likely it is that we're seeing random fluctuations. In some sciences, 3-𝝈 tests are sufficient for burden proof in which there is a 3/1000, or 0.3%, chance that the phenomena in question is a statistical fluctuation.

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Succinctly, the 5-𝝈 test tells us that there is an incredibly low probability that the data we observed is a random fluctuation in the data. The difference between 3-𝝈 and 5-𝝈 is the probability that we have merely observed a random fluctuation in the data which doesn't tell us what we want.

Let’s apply this logic to the discovery of gravitational waves and the Higgs boson. The recent discovery of gravitational waves gave the final conformation that general relativity, and no alternatives, is the best theory we have for explaining relativistic physics. The Higgs boson confirmed the Standard Model of Particle Physics was accurate and that particles gain mass through the Higgs field generated by the Higgs boson. Discovering gravitational waves and the Higgs boson required a more sophisticated variant of the 5-𝝈 test.

Regards gravitational waves, advanced filtering techniques were used on the data sample which were then compared to templates of what we would expect from a gravitational wave. Once the comparison between the filtered data and the templates satisfied the 5-𝝈 test, physicists announced the discovery of gravitational waves.

Likewise with the Higgs boson, a complex statistical analysis was required over multiple decay paths and detectors before the 5-𝝈 burden of proof was satisfied. In advanced physics, it is rare that the simplified version of the test is sufficient and that more advanced statistical and data analysis techniques are required so a discovery can be made. However, the statistical logic of how the probability of data being a random fluctuation and not the phenomena in question still holds.

Statistical reasoning, not consensus, determines the effectiveness of a test in uncovering the investigated phenomena. Consensus only emerges after a hypothesis passes the “n-𝝈” test, where n represents the number of standard deviations from the mean. Another consensus exists within the methodology itself, based on the principles of probability theory. This consensus validates the scientific method, not any specific result derived from it. Therefore, objective facts do exist.

Does the consensus in the scientific methodology support Rorty's pragmatic scepticism? No. Any consensus that arises about whether to use 5-𝝈, or 4-𝝈, or 6-𝝈, is dependent on probabilistic arguments and the practicality of using a specific test. For instance, suppose we used 3-𝝈 as a criteria for making a discovery. There's always a risk that we get false positive results meaning we make discoveries that shouldn't be made. This even applies, via experience, to 4-𝝈 test results. So far, we have had no issues, at least what we're aware of, of getting false positives with 5-𝝈. The problem with 6-𝝈 is it requires so much evidential proof that science wouldn't even yield many productive results. Even though a consensus does emerge on the burden of proof, it's grounded in probabilistic and practical reasoning.

What is a fact?

We've already determined that a fact needn't be determined by consensus, but rather by the probability that the data supports the truth of a proposition. This probability needn't be direct support for the proposition either. Typically scientists test a prediction of the theory, and if the prediction upholds then the theory is validated.

A common misconception about objective facts is that they must be absolute truths. That's plainly wrong because we rarely have 100% certainty that any given proposition or theory is true. The scientific method deals with probabilities that at best approximate a value close to 100%, while never reaching there. Mathematical theorems we can be certain of, assuming particular axioms hold true. However, we don't merely want to define facts as analytic a priori propositions.

A proposition is a fact if and only if the probability of the truth of the proposition is sufficiently high that we have no reason in thinking the proposition will be false unless an enormous amount of evidence arises that proves the contrary.

This definition is very similar to Charles Sanders Peirce's Pragmatic Theory of Truth. The key point in Peirce's theory is that a proposition is true when after a systematic study we are unlikely to decide that proposition is false, because it no longer produces practical consequences. The primary difference is that I have attached a probabilistic weight as a measure for determining when it's very unlikely that evidence opposing the truth of the proposition will arise.

In other words,

a fact is a pragmatically true proposition

Even though we acknowledged the role consensus plays in deciding the burden of proof, it still fits Peirce's theory better than Rorty's. The social consensus emerges about what burden of proof we should uphold so that within practical and probabilistic reasoning, we can safely say that a theory is pragmatically true.

Conclusion

Postmodern skeptics erroneously equate the sociology of scientific knowledge, which encompasses the social process of acquiring knowledge, with epistemology of science, which delves into the study of determining which scientific truths we know. Scientists are not rigid adherents of the scientific method, as Thomas Kuhn points out. They possess their own pet theories and biases that reject theories such as Quantum Mechanics. Even Albert Einstein was not immune to this tendency.

"I, at any rate, am convinced that [God] does not throw dice" - Albert Einstein

Einstein vehemently rejected the probabilistic interpretations of quantum mechanics because they contradicted his understanding of physical reality, a stance that some consider his greatest error. He encountered similar resistance when introducing his theory of special and general relativity. The traditional scientific community resisted accepting a relativistic concept of space-time, preferring the absolute space and time described by Isaac Newton. As a society, scientists are often resistant to change. The complexities of quantum mechanics initially baffled physicists, yet the theory's rigorous methodology and unparalleled predictive accuracy provided the only compelling reason to continue developing it. The successful predictions of quantum mechanics, such as the double-slit experiment, validated the theory. It was the epistemic validity of the scientific method that granted the pioneers of quantum mechanics the social power to initiate another scientific revolution.

Postmodern scepticism is merely another form of philosophical scepticism that lacks practical utility and fails to elucidate the workings of science. A naturalistic pragmatist epistemology provides the most comprehensive explanation for the scientific method, which can adopt either realism or anti-realism as its stance. While correspondence with reality is a crucial yet not exclusive criterion for a sound scientific theory, it is not a necessary condition for its success.

Part Two: Moral and Political Philosophy

So far we have demonstrated that the first three theses of postmodern scepticism only hold on a circumstantial basis. When the theses do hold we have far more reason to uphold a pragmatist epistemology than adhere to postmodern scepticism. However, we have not touched thesis 4 which will be our aim now.

The scientific method neither provide insights into what constitutes right and wrong, nor how to live the good life, nor guide us in how we should organise our political systems. Nevertheless, the scientific method is useful for asserting facts relating to the world, even if we cannot determine that those facts correspond with reality.

A healthy scepticism is always welcome in philosophy and society as a whole. We should never accept the truth of a claim at face value, especially when influential figures are behind them.

Postmodernism adds value here showcasing the influence powerful institutions and public/private bodies in shaping consensus, even knowledge, of the world around us. Its focus on how meta-narratives influences how we perceive our own societies influence the very social fabric we inhabit. Should we consider ourselves part of the free world? Or is that a myth used by the ruling classes in sustaining their rule? Or are those sceptical laden with their own agenda for a new regime which may be more or less free?

Successful societies, however, require robust institutions that necessitate sufficient trust for people to somewhat regard them as authorities to be followed. This trust needn't come at the expense of scepticism; in fact, it can be beneficial. Scepticism somewhat acts as a counterbalancing force to propaganda which can make it less effective. As a result, some honesty by public authorities is required. Nevertheless, a scepticism that fosters widespread mistrust in institutions can be detrimental to the well-being of a polity, although it may sometimes be necessary for radical transformation. Without that trust, the institutions cannot project the authority required in managing their affairs of the polity creating political instability and even worse.

What we will do is investigate how postmodern scepticism helps us with an extreme but highly important moral scenario that our polities face today - genocide.

Case Study - Genocide

Multiple genocides are happening in the world to this day. The most prevalent and infamous genocide is the one conducted by Israel towards the Palestinian people in both Gaza and the West Bank, with the former being the centre of concern. There is not a day when we see images of the complete destruction of Gaza with endless and mindless violence designed to destroy the conditions for life for the Palestinian people. Even in the West Bank, there is violence and ethnic cleansing of Palestinians at the hands of state-backed settlers.

The genocide in Gaza is not the only genocide that is happening, or recently happened. There is ample evidence that:

We are primarily looking for a systematic enquiry demonstrating a basis for the claim that a particular group is being destroyed, according to whichever definition of genocide we deem fit. That may involve Raphael Lemkin's definition, or the legal definition found in the 1948 Genocide Convention.

Thesis 4 claims that there is no objective fact that we, humanity, are a moral community. However, thesis 4 can also be applied to national groups, religious groups, and so on. Does the lack of an objective moral community alongside upholding the other theses imply that there is no objective fact that a genocide is happening?

The issue of moral community is important, because only certain types of groups deemed of moral worth can face genocide. For instance, legally, under the 1948 Genocide Convention, exterminating all gay people wouldn't constitute genocide because targeting people to be destroyed based on their sexual orientation doesn't fall within the legal remit of genocide.

Essentially we presume that a community must be a moral community for genocide to be applicable. The consensus of the world at the time was that LGBTQ+ people didn't warrant falling under the remit despite them being victims of the Holocaust, so they weren't deemed a moral community at the time. Now I would argue that sexual orientation and other types of categories currently excluded, e.g. sex and social class, should fall under the remit of genocide, but that still doesn't undermine the point that moral communities need to be the target for destruction or the genocide label to be applicable.

Legally, a moral community needn't actually exist for you to face persecution, discrimination, apartheid, or genocide. Being perceived to be a member of that group is sufficient. For instance, a biological race needn't exist for racial discrimination to occur. However, we still treat that perceived racial group as an moral community because people see them that way.

Genocide is typically justified by targeting a group because objectively they have no legitimate right to exist. It's not stated that way explicitly. It's typically phrased through other means. For instance, some Israelis deny that the Palestinian national group is a legitimate national identity because it was fabricated as part of some Arab conspiracy to undermine the Jewish state. Russia denies that the Ukrainian national identity actually exists stating instead that they're Russians.

Worse, suppose we accept they exist as a group but not a moral community. Exterminating them, persecuting them and so on can easily be legitimised through dehumanisation techniques. Some Israelis do believe the Palestinian national identity exists but uphold they are Nazi sympathising Islamists, Hamas supporters, who pose an existential threat to the Israeli state so must be "totally defeated", a euphemism for being destroyed. Likewise, Russians will accept the Ukrainian national identity exists but associate it with Nazism because certain Ukrainian national groups felt the Nazis were liberators from the oppressive USSR which oversaw the Holodomor. De-nazifiction for Russia means destroying the Ukrainian national identity which is seen inherently as fascist.

Let's look at another example. China's genocide of the Uyghur's in what was East Turkestan (Qurighar), and now Xinjiang (新疆维吾尔自治区). The two groups have completely different conceptions of the identity of the Uyghurs. The Uyghurs see themselves as distinct from the Chinese nation, especially the Han Chinese. In contrast, the Chinese see the Uyghur's as a distinct ethnic minority which forms part of the larger Chinese nation. To combat what the Chinese perceived as 'Islamist terrorism' and what the Uyghurs see as their essential identity, internment camps were created forcefully detaining a couple of million of Uyghurs. During this time, sterilisation of Uyghurs occurred resulting in a 60% reduction in the birth rate among Uyghurs. Why? Suppressing a national identity at odds with the Chinese conception of what the Uyghurs are.

Here lies the importance of an objective moral community. It's clear we cannot rely on thesis 3 that consensus determines facts. There's clear cases where we want to say that the Uyghurs are moral community deserving dignity no matter what the CCP or Han Chinese think about the ethnic minority. Likewise for the Palestinians and Ukrainians. We also can't say, for instance, the global community opinion matters because what if the global community themselves deny, persecute or even want to genocide a particular group. Non-heterosexual sexual orientations are persecuted around the world and not deemed 'worthy' enough of being placed under the Genocide Convention, despite Nazi atrocities to LGBTQ+ people.

It is a historical fact that the powerful who can successfully propagate a world view decide what the history is. Zionist historians did this in denying the extent of the Nakba for decades until the Revisionist historians came along. Chinese propaganda is suppressing dissenting voices among the Uyghurs and others in the regime, with too many economically dependent on China to cry about genocide and human rights violations.

Consequently, responding to and fighting against genocides requires an objective moral community. We cannot rely on socially constructed consensus, or that some, are better than others. We have a circular argument in which socially constructed consensus is required to determine which socially constructed consensus are better than others. If an alternative socially constructed consensus which enables persecution, genocide, discrimination, etc., arises which is more useful for the social group in question, then we have problems. Rorty himself does this assuming liberal modernity in the US is best. But what if the US decides that fascism is the best way to go to retain its imperial hegemony? Postmodern scepticism provides us few tools for actually combatting the most heinous acts humanity can commit.

Finally we must clarify what we mean by an objective moral community. We distinguish ontological and normative objectivity. Ontological objectivity state a group objectively exists. This is insufficient because what if people are being destroyed for a group they are perceived of being part. Instead normative objectivity focuses

Consequently, we have good pragmatic and ethical reasons for rejecting Thesis 4. If we accept thesis 4, we concede too much ground to those who wish to commit then most heinous crimes, whether genocide, apartheid, crimes against humanity, and so on. Even though we rightfully distinguish between scepticism of a moral community and the denial of one, it's not difficult seeing how the former leads into the latter in political context in which a threat is perceived. In the battlegrounds of politics in which conflict is rife, threats are potentially everywhere. Upholding thesis 4 from a pragmatic perspective only makes sense if the society is already healthy.

Conclusion

We’ve demonstrated that postmodern scepticism isn't a tenable position from both an epistemological and morally pragmatic stance. In particular contexts, the individual theses of it have merit and postmodern insights into how power shapes social reality are pivotal for understanding the modern world. Objectivity can also deceive us when it blinds us to what is happening, or we choose to be blinded through ignorance. Nevertheless, objectivity serves a pragmatic purpose as a source for grounding a common logic by which a social order can anchor itself into.

The task of pragmatism is delineating how using rigorous scientific and logical analysis in providing an objective grounding for society can still accommodate that a rationally constructed is also a myth. The new sciences in complexity science and chaos theory actually help in this regard as we can accept an evolutionary logic while sticking to the principles of rational sceptical enquiry. Postmodern insights can also help us explain how such complex systems actually work when applied to society and even give in specific cases justification for engaging in some or all of the theses of postmodern scepticism.

Even though postmodernism can make us realise that the truths we supposedly upheld are influenced by powerful agents and forces in our society, ultimately, having objective facts at our disposal are more effective in providing robust moral and political criticism. The core question of political philosophy is:

How is a system predicated on the utilisation of power as the raison d'être of politics coherent with a politics focussed on attaining a resemblance of justice, in a world constrained by epistemological limits on what is and isn't just, without it descending into the worship of power for the sake of power?

Postmodern scepticism doesn't help us in that regard. On the gravest crime humanity can face, the (eventual) annihilation of entire people based on who they are, the limits of postmodern scepticism are clear.

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